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Kirk Julliard Gosch appeals from his judgment of conviction for manufacturing a
controlled substance (marijuana), possession of a controlled substance with the intent
to deliver (marijuana), and possession of marijuana in excess of three ounces.
Mr. Gosch was convicted following a jury trial, and the district court imposed unified
sentences of five years, with two years fixed, and placed Mr. Gosch on probation.
Mr. Gosch now appeals, and he asserts that the district court erred by denying his
motion to suppress. This Reply Brief addresses the State's assertions that the vehicle
was part of the premises, that the automobile exception applies, that inevitable
discovery applies, and that the error is harmless.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Gosch's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
the district court err by denying Mr. Gosch's motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT

A.

Introduction
Mr. Gosch asserts that the automobile exception does not apply in this case.

Therefore, he asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress.
This Reply Brief addresses the State's assertions that the vehicle was part of the
premises, that the automobile exception applies, that inevitable discovery applies, and
that the error is harmless.

B.

The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Gosch's Motion To Suppress

1.

Premises

Relying on United States v. Gottschalk, 915 F.2d 1459 (10 1h Cir. 1990), the State
asserts that the Suzuki should be considered part of the premises. (Respondent's Brief,
pp.5-8.) The State is incorrect for several reasons.

First, there is a large difference

between the warrant issued in the present case and the warrant issued in Gottschalk.
As the State notes, in Gottschalk, the "warrant did not specifically list any vehicles to be
searched,

but

rather

authorized

the

search

of

the

entire

premises

for

methamphetamine." Gottschalk, 915 F.2d at 1460. The warrant in this case, however,
specifically defined the premises to be searched: "11974 North Rimrock Road, further
described as a family dwelling, or apartment located above a garage being located
directly west of 11970 N. Rimrock Road, having an entry on the southside of the
structure which is the only entrance to the apartment." (R., p.33.) Thus, the "premises"
is specifically defined as the dwelling or apartment located above a garage.
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This distinction is imporiant. Citing to Gottschalk and cases
in United States v. Barth,

F. Supp.

1021 (0. N. D.

it, the district
held that

language of the warrant was significant:
The search warrants at issue in this case bear a subtle yet distinctive
difference from those at issue in the cases cited above. By definition, a
search of the "premises" is more expansive than a mere search of a
building in that it would encompass the building and its grounds. However,
the search warrants issued by Judge Romanick only allowed for a search
of specific buildings. The warrants did not expressly authorize a search of
the buildings and the grounds or premises. It is clear that Barth's
challenge to the search of the Chevy pickup would fail if the search
warrants had contained a specific reference to the "premises." However,
the undisputed fact remains that the search warrants incorporated no such
language.

/d. at 1027.

In this case, the magistrate specifically defined the "premises" as the

dwelling, not the entire premises, including vehicles.
Second, after identifying the dwelling to be searched, the magistrate authorized
the search of a black Jeep in the warrant. (R., p.33.) By specifically listing this vehicle
to be searched in addition to the residence, it is clear that the magistrate was
authorizing only a search of the dwelling and this particular vehicle; if the magistrate
intended the search warrant to cover any vehicle on the premises, listing the Jeep as
another item to be searched would be unnecessary.

"In statutory interpretation, the

maxim 'expressio unius est exclusio alterius,' meaning that the specific mention of
certain things implies the exclusion of all others, is a recognized rule." State v. Acuna,
154 Idaho 139, 142, 294 P.3d 1151, 1154 (Ct. App. 2013).

While it is generally a

maxim in statutory construction, there is no reason the principle should not be applied to
the language of warrants. The Suzuki was not part of the "premises" in this case and
therefore the order denying the motion to suppress cannot be affirmed on this basis.
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2.

Automobile Exception

Mr. Gosch asserts that none of the rationales supporting the automobile
exception apply in this case. The State asserts that the automobile exception applies
regardless of whether it proved either that the vehicle was mobile or that the vehicle
was not in a place "regularly used for residential purposes." (Respondent's Brief, pp.1 012.) Mr. Gosch continues to assert that the State is incorrect because the exception
does not apply when its underlying justifications are not present.
With regard to the mobility argument, Mr. Gosch will rest on the opening brief.
With regard to the vehicle's placement on private property, the State cites United

States v. Ludwig, 10 F.3d 1523 (1oth Cir. 1993 ), for the proposition that the only
question is whether the "vehicle is so situated at that objective observer would conclude
that it was being used not as a residence, but a vehicle." (Respondent's Brief, pp.1112.) Other courts disagree. Based on California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985), the
Georgia Supreme Court has concluded that the automobile exception did not apply
where the suspect's vehicle was legally parked in a residential parking space, and the
suspect did not have access to it. State v. LeJeune, 576 S.E. 2d. 888 (Ga. 2003). The
court thus concluded that, because the underlying justifications for the exception did not
apply, the exception did not apply. /d. This Court should hold the same.
Moreover, a holding that the police could conduct a warrantless search in the
driveway would run afoul of the recent opinion in Florida v. Jardines, _
S.Ct. 1409 (2013).

U.S._, 133

In Jardines, a police officer, a drug dog, and the dog's handler

walked up to the front porch of Jardine's house without a warrant. /d. at 1413. While on
the porch, the dog alerted for the presence of illegal drugs. /d. Based upon the alert,
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the officers applied for and obtained a

warrant to

the house. !d. Jardines

moved to suppress, asserting his Fourth Amendment rights were violated
officers' actions. /d.

the

The Florida Supreme Court agreed, and the United States

Supreme Court affirmed. /d.
The United States Supreme Court determined that the officers were on the
curtilage of the residence and then looked to the purpose of their visit:
"A license may be implied from the habits of the country," notwithstanding
the "strict rule of the English common law as to entry upon a close."
McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127, 136, 43 S.Ct. 16, 67 L.Ed. 167 (1922)
(Holmes, J.). We have accordingly recognized that "the knocker on the
front door is treated as an invitation or license to attempt an entry,
justifying ingress to the home by solicitors, hawkers and peddlers of all
kinds." Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626, 71 S.Ct. 920, 95 L.Ed.
1233 (1951 ). This implicit license typically permits the visitor to approach
the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received,
and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave. Complying with the
terms of that traditional invitation does not require fine-grained legal
knowledge; it is generally managed without incident by the Nation's Girl
Scouts and trick-or-treaters. Thus, a police officer not armed with a
warrant may approach a home and knock, precisely because that is "no
more than any private citizen might do." Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S.--,
- - , 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1862, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011).

/d.

at 1415-16 (footnote omitted). The Court then determined that the intent of the

officer was relevant to determine the scope of the license, and that the intent to search
was not within that license:
Here, however, the question before the court is precisely whether the
officer's conduct was an objectively reasonable search. As we have
described, that depends upon whether the officers had an implied license
to enter the porch, which in turn depends upon the purpose for which they
entered. Here, their behavior objectively reveals a purpose to conduct a
search, which is not what anyone would think he had license to do.
/d. 1416-17. Just as in Jardines, there would be no implied license for a person to

enter a driveway with the intent to conduct a search of a vehicle.
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Mr. Gosch

""''''"'/"''"' that his case is different than Jardines in that
warrant and thus could search the premises as described in

officers did have a
'Narrant, but the

ramifications of a broad holding that a car on private property can be searched would
run afoul of Jardines.

3.

Inevitable Discovery

The States asserts that, "after seeing the items moved from Gosch's home to the
Suzuki and obtaining a positive alert on the Suzuki, the police undoubtedly would have
been able to obtain a separate search warrant for the Suzuki." (Respondent's Brief,
14.) Thus, the State asserts that the inevitable discovery should apply. However, the
doctrine of inevitable discovery "is not intended to swallow the exclusionary rule whole
by substituting what the police should have done for what they really did." State v.
Cook, 106 Idaho 209, 226 (Ct. App. 1984 ).

"It has been narrowly enunciated and

applied by the United States Supreme Court." /d. The State's argument is, essentially,
that since the police may have been able to obtain a warrant, inevitable discovery
should apply. This is exactly "substituting what the police should have done for what
they really did."

As such, inevitable discovery does not prevent exclusion of the

evidence.

4.

Harmlessness

Finally, the State asserts that any error is harmless with regard to the
manufacturing marijuana charge because that charge was based on compounding or
converting or processing marijuana into honey oil and honey oil, along with other items
relating to the manufacture of marijuana were found in the home. (Respondent's Brief,
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~1

)

However, the jury could have tied the marijuana found in the
and determined that this marijuana was

ki to

in the manufacturing. It was

Mr. Gosch's defense at trial was that it was other individuals that lived at the residence,
and not him, that manufactured marijuana. Because the evidence of the drugs found in
the vehicle could tie him to manufacturing, it cannot be said that the error was harmless.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Gosch respectfully requests that the district court's order denying his motion
to suppress be reversed, that his convictions be vacated, and that this case be
remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this 8 1h day of September, 2014.

JUSTIN M. CURTIS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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